EUROPE'S GLOBAL ROLE
1 Let me offer my warmest congratulations to the new members of the expanded EU. The expansion of EU is a historic event. It signifies an end to the divisions of the Cold War. What began as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, with just six countries, is now an integrated union of twenty-five. It is indeed a proud achievement for Europe.
2 Europe's experience in regional integration is unique. Never before in the history of the modern state system has there been such a bold experiment in the pooling of sovereignties. Yet Europe's expansion and integration is also in line with the principal trends of the post-Cold War world.
Global Trend Towards Regional Integration
3 The Americas are coalescing. North and South America are being drawn together by the powerful gravitational attraction of the US economy; firstly, through the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and eventually through the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA).
4 A new hemispheric history is being written. In a different way, East Asia is being woven together by a web of bilateral and plurilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), centred on the ASEAN + 3 process. Eventually, India too will be integrated into East Asia, changing conventional geographical concepts of regions in Asia.
5 These three models of regionalism are very different. All are works in progress. Their outcomes cannot be predicted with certainty.
6 Regionalism and globalisation are not alternatives but different aspects of the same phenomenon. They are driven by the same market forces. I believe that the two great strategic issues of the 21st Century are consequences of this phenomenon. How to deal with the marginalised? Not all regions or every country in these three regions have been able to cope with the relentless competitive pressures of the new world that is emerging. And how will the Americas, Europe and Asia relate to each other?
Relations Between the US, Europe and Asia
7 This evening, I want to focus my remarks on the second issue. This is not because I consider the first unimportant. But unless relations between the three principal regions of the international system are stable and constructive, no other international issue can be easily resolved.
8 The Europe of twenty-five states has less than one tenth of the world's population. Yet it accounts for over a quarter of the world's GDP and almost a fifth of world trade. Its potential impact on others, both positive and negative, is undoubtedly great. How do we accentuate the positive and attenuate the negative?
9 All three regions share some things in common. All are for free markets; all have pluralistic political systems. Yet the nuances between their interpretations of these broad values are significant, the result of differences of history, political traditions, geography and strategic circumstances.
10 Stable and positive relations between the three regions cannot be taken for granted and will not evolve of themselves. They must be consciously constructed, nurtured and sustained. My worry is that without the common strategic reference point of the Cold War, the risk of the regions drifting apart is real. There are signs that this is already happening.
Transatlantic Rift
11 The most obvious and most disturbing trends are, of course, in transatlantic relations, brought to a head by deep disagreement over Iraq. Beyond Iraq, differences on how terrorism should be fought, trade and other issues also strain the relationship.
12 Strains in transatlantic relations are not new. Europe is an old civilisation with a long history. Not surprisingly, Europeans look at the world differently from the US. During the Cold War, this difference in worldview sometimes manifested itself in Europe's discomfort with what was regarded as America's simplistic anti-communism and over-emphasis on military preparedness. The most frequent European complaint was that the US acted too much on its own. On the other hand, the most frequent American complaint was that Europe was too complacent and did too little for the common defence.
13 I fear that now that the Cold War is over, both Europe and America may be tempted to believe that the strains in their relationship are relatively risk-free.
14 Yet together the US and Europe represent the core of global political stability and economic wealth - no less now than during the Cold War. Acting together, Europe and America will be more globally influential. Europe's instinct for multilateralism complements the occasional need for direct action which only the US can lead.
15 That is why our common enemies, the terrorists, have put so much effort into breaking the transatlantic alliance. They have not succeeded but may well make progress. They must not be allowed to succeed; not over Iraq or any other issue. A serious transatlantic rift will be immensely destructive to Europe, America and the world. For while the Cold War is no more, in its place is the hot War on Terror. And this war of terror is mounted by religious fanatics who see no place for non-Muslims in their vision of an Islamic caliphate.
Europe's Relations with Asia
16 The risks in Europe's relations with Asia are more subtle. It is one of benign neglect. Europe's fundamental priorities are internal, followed by relations with America. So too are Asia's fundamental priorities internal and transpacific.
17 Of course, this does not mean that we are off each other's radar screens. We do not and cannot ignore each other. But I often ask myself how significant a blip is Asia to Europe and vice versa? And it was because of this concern that almost ten years ago I proposed an Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) to bridge the gap in interactions between our regions.
18 ASEM was intended to serve as an institutional framework for our regions to systematically engage each other. How successful has it been?
19 ASEM has had four Summits, six Foreign Ministers' Meetings and numerous exchanges at the officials' level. There have been many activities under the umbrella of ASEM cooperation. This is not a bad record but the momentum seems to have slackened.
20 When I ask myself whether Europe-Asia relations have realised their full global strategic potential, the frank and realistic answer must be 'not yet'.
21 There are, I think, some significant differences of strategic perspectives.
The Central Role of the US
22 I perceive a significant nuance in strategic assessments of America's global role. In Asia, as in Europe, discomfort over America's overwhelming global dominance and its inclination towards unilateralism is high. But at the same time, I sense that there is a sharper awareness in Asia than in Europe of the vital and irreplaceable role that America plays in maintaining global stability.
23 Perhaps this is because unlike in Europe, where the threat of war has never been lower in modern history, Asia still faces many serious security challenges. North Korea, Kashmir and cross-strait relations between Beijing and Taipei are real potential flashpoints. If things go disastrously wrong, nuclear conflict is not inconceivable. This focuses Asian minds. The US is critical to the management and resolution of all three potential conflicts.
24 Perhaps that is why, no matter what their misgivings are, only a few Asian countries and certainly no major US ally came out to oppose the US on Iraq. Support for the US in Iraq has not been without its domestic complications for US friends and allies in East Asia. But all East Asian governments know that in Iraq, the fundamental question now is the credibility and resolve of the US.
25 This is, I think, an interest that Asia and Europe share in common. If America departs unceremoniously and leaves behind an Iraq in shambles, its credibility and resolve to fight terrorism will be severely degraded. And the whole of the Middle East will probably explode. We will all be at greater risk from terrorism and rogue states. Oil will be used as a weapon to bring down the West and the world economy. It is, therefore, in our common interest to work together to create conditions, whether through the UN or some other modality, to make the US presence in Iraq more politically sustainable. Better still if all of us can chip in to bring about peace and stability in Iraq. This in turn will, as I recently stated in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC, require, among other things, a more balanced American approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. This is another area where Europe and Asia can work together.
26 Please do not misunderstand. I am certainly not advocating, as some voices both in Europe and Asia do, that we should somehow 'gang up' against the US. That would be foolish and self-defeating, the surest way to marginalise ourselves. But if Europe and Asia can forge a consensus on the central role of the US in Iraq and the Middle East, we may be able to work with the US to advance our common interests and goals.
27 It is very easy for Europe and Asia to agree to disagree with the US. It is much more difficult, but also much more important, for us to try and find the common ground that will enable Asia and Europe to complement the US in the interests of global stability. This will require a deeper and more substantive strategic dialogue between Europe and Asia than has hitherto been evident in ASEM or any other forum.
Deepening Asia-Europe Relations
28 This brings me to a delicate subject. Economically, the EU is undoubtedly greater than the sum of its parts. The same cannot be said politically or strategically.
29 A Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a noble and ambitious aspiration. But noble aspirations have not yet been able to overcome narrow self-interests. At least in its relationship with Asia, the CFSP is more often than not at the lowest common denominator. This is an obstacle to a real strategic dialogue.
30 Take for example, Myanmar, which has come to disproportionately preoccupy Asia-Europe political exchanges. It is not a secret that Asian countries do not always share the same view as Europe on Myanmar. It is also not a secret that not all EU members see Myanmar the same way. And it is no secret that some Asian countries share common views with some European countries on Myanmar.
31 This is quite natural. Myanmar is in fact an issue on which different countries can legitimately hold different views. But precisely because the EU is obliged to profess a common position, Myanmar has become an obstacle to seeking common ground on other more strategic issues. Both the ASEAN-EU and ASEM processes have come to be held hostage by a single issue.
32 The result is an impoverishment of dialogue and the overshadowing of more important strategic issues by ritualistic exchanges. Too often, Asia and Europe are talking at and not with each other. The complexity of forging a real consensus on a common position will undoubtedly get more acute in a Europe of twenty-five.
33 But unless a solution is found, Europe's most substantive political and strategic exchanges with Asia will be bilateral, with only token gestures towards the CFSP. If Europe's most important interactions with Asia are bilateral, it is the new EU members, whose historical and substantive connections with Asia are shallower, that will be the most disadvantaged.
34 The same dynamic holds true in the economic area. The economic rationale for Europe's engagement with Asia is obvious. The World Bank has predicted that East Asian economies will collectively grow by six per cent this year. My concern here is not so much with business. I am confident that businesses will go where the opportunities are. But in an interdependent world where the primary driving forces are increasingly trade, investments and finance, economic engagement has a strategic as well as commercial dimension. This cannot be shaped solely by businesses or market forces.
35 The key challenges of our time are transnational and trans-regional. Terrorism is the most obvious and urgent but by no means the only example. Drug trafficking, money laundering and people smuggling are other examples. To adequately meet these challenges, regionalism must be buttressed by robust trans-regional linkages. This gives an important strategic dimension to institutions such as APEC, complemented by the intra-regional and transpacific FTAs that have been signed or are now being explored.
36 The US, China, Japan, India, Australia, South Korea and even distant Chile are all actively and substantively engaging ASEAN countries through bilateral and plurilateral FTAs. Europe as the EU is hesitant.
37 There is no equivalent of APEC for Asia-Europe relations. ASEM does not play such a role. It was never intended to do so. Nor does the Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Initiative (TREATI) initiated last year. It is only a first step, and one contingent on the successful conclusion of the current round of global multilateral trade negotiations. Given the complexity of those discussions, whether TREATI can address current urgent concerns in a timely manner is a legitimate question.
38 Relations between our regions are good. But they are passive rather than passionate. They are nowhere near their maximum potential. Also, I do not think they adequately address the challenges of our times. The issues I have highlighted in the EU's current approach to Asia are for the EU to resolve. Undoubtedly, an EU of twenty-five must evolve a new internal dynamic that will be different from the old dynamic. Nor do I mean to suggest that Asia is without its share of responsibility for the current state of Asia-EU relations.
Conclusion
39 Fifty-four years ago, Robert Schuman proclaimed the birth of a new Europe saying, "World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it". He was referring to the Cold War. Europe rose to meet that challenge. And a unifying Europe united with America and Asia to win the Cold War.
40 After the Cold War, after 9/11, after Iraq and now after the 3/11 Madrid bombings, Schuman's statement has a wider relevance. It is again incumbent on all of us - Europe, Asia and America - to find the political will to unite to creatively meet the compelling and dangerous challenges of the 21st Century.
41 Thank you.