On the eve of the upcoming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference scheduled to take place from 3 - 28 May 2010 in New York, it is useful to reflect on where we stand, 40 years after the entry into force of the NPT in 1970, on the issues of disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (PUNE). The NPT remains the only near universal non-proliferation regime to-date. However, the NPT regime is now under serious stress. It remains weak in enforcement.
While many experts and countries maintain that the issues of disarmament, non-proliferation and the PUNE are equally important and mutually reinforcing, in practice, unfortunately, different emphasis has been placed on the 3 pillars, depending on where their national interest and priorities lie.
On disarmament, the political will to bring about the realisation of Article VI of the NPT remains weak. More efforts need to be put in on disarmament before we could achieve the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.
The recent conclusion of the follow-on treaty to START between the US and Russia is a positive development. However, the size of the global nuclear arsenal remains large. There are still around 20,000 nuclear warheads in the world. Many of them are still on trigger-alert. The call for and by the US, a Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), to review the role of nuclear weapons in its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), is a good starting point. For example, the NPR strengthens the long-standing US "negative security assurance" associated with the NPT. The proposal by a number of NATO countries to urge the review of NATO's strategy in this area is also encouraging. A serious and rigorous examination of this question should be undertaken and practical steps with a specific time frame towards concrete and verifiable disarmament should be discussed.
On the important pillar of non-proliferation, while the NPT has successfully limited the number of NWS from what would otherwise have been the case had there been no NPT regime, the international community continues to face serious proliferation concerns. In fact, the risk of proliferation has increased.
3 key states, which are not part of the NPT, have or are strongly believed to have nuclear weapons. India, Pakistan and Israel represent a lacuna in the NPT regime. The NPT did not deter the DPRK, a NNWS within the regime, from acquiring and testing nuclear devices, and subsequently withdrawing from the NPT. We have a country within the NPT which has been suspected by the IAEA of pursuing a nuclear weapons programme, that is, our host country. We do not know whether the allegations are true or false. We strongly believe that Iran, with which we have excellent bilateral relations, should clear this up and should cooperate fully with the IAEA.
As interest in nuclear energy grows as a result of rising costs in traditional fuel as well as the concerns over climate change, nuclear technology will continue to spread without checks. These would include activities that could be used for a nuclear weapons programme, e.g. uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. Non-state actors, particularly, terrorists groups, are believed to be keen on acquiring nuclear material and nuclear weapons to launch terrorist attacks.
Hence, the international community faces a dilemma: how do we seek to strengthen the non-proliferation regime while acknowledging the right of countries to pursue nuclear energy and technology for peaceful uses?
The international community must come to an understanding that while Article IV of the NPT highlighted the inalienable right of all NPT States Party to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology, this right carries with it responsibilities and obligations. Both the NWS and NNWS have a role to play to ensure that the NPT will continue to be relevant today.
First, the NWS should be committed to their NPT obligations, not to, inter alia, provide technology transfer, in violation of NPT provisions, to NNWS and particularly to those outside the NPT framework. Second, we must find a mechanism to encourage those with nuclear weapon capability which are outside the NPT to abide by the same international rules and safeguards; as well as to find a way to bring them in.
Third, the NNWS should be strongly encouraged to accept more stringent safeguards and verification regime in order to prevent further proliferation activities. These would include signing on to the IAEA's Additional Protocol, cooperating closely with the Agency on these issues and fully implementing the requirements of the relevant IAEA Board and UNSC resolutions. The right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology is not inconsistent with the responsibility to meet international obligations and to address the issue of confidence deficit on suspected nuclear weapons programme. Fourth, we must find a way to encourage the DPRK which has withdrawn from the NPT to return back to the global non-proliferation regime. In the mean time, it has to abide by their international obligations.
Fifth, both the NWS and the NNWS should adopt higher standards of nuclear safety and security to ensure that nuclear material and facilities under their control remain safe and secure from, inter alia, theft and terrorist attack respectively. These two concepts are closely inter-related and they are also important elements in international counter-proliferation efforts. In this regard, given the important role which the IAEA has been playing in setting international norms and standards on nuclear safety and security issues, we should seek to strengthen the IAEA's role and capacity in this area.
We believe that the promotion of nuclear safety and security issues will not compromise IAEA's role in promoting civilian nuclear energy but in fact, further strengthen it. Having a strong nuclear safety and security regime in place will help the NPT States Party assuage concerns both at the domestic and at the international front that their nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes and that they could help reduce the risk of proliferation. In our case, Singapore too has not ruled out nuclear energy to meet our needs and will soon embark on a feasibility study which will entail a careful and rigorous examination of the technical, economic and safety aspects of nuclear energy. This process is still at a preliminary stage but we will enhance our cooperation with the IAEA and nuclear suppliers as our study progresses.
Sixth, to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, we should encourage the establishment of a more robust global export control regime to guard against the illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. While not denying NNWS their right to acquire civilian nuclear technology, the establishment of a multilateral fuel assurance mechanism could help prevent the further spread of nuclear know-how; yet at the same time provide countries interested in pursuing nuclear energy and technology the means to do so.
The NPT regime was conceived in a different time and age to deal with very different challenges. Hence, it is important that the NPT be brought up to date and further strengthened. We hope that all NPT States Party could take the opportunity of the upcoming NPT Review Conference to begin this process. It will not be easy but it is necessary. It will be disastrous if the Review Conference ends up in shambles again. The inherent contradictions in the NPT regime were exposed during the 1995 NPT Review Conference where, in a quite bizarre manner, all parties unanimously agreed to the indefinite extension of the NPT without amendment, but were unable to agree on the principles to guide the implementation of the NPT. It would appear that agreement on making the NPT permanent was not dependent on all parties agreeing whether it was being implemented properly.
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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SINGAPORE
18 APRIL 2010