TRANSCRIPT OF MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS K SHANMUGAM’S REPLY TO THE PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS, 13 AUGUST 2012
QUESTIONS:
MR YEE JENN JONG: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the failure by ASEAN to issue a joint statement over how to deal with claims on disputed territories in the South China Sea has affected working relationships within ASEAN and between ASEAN and China.
MS IRENE NG PHEK HOONG: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs given ASEAN's unprecedented failure at its recent Ministerial Meeting to issue a joint communiqué, what are the implications of the deep divisions within ASEAN on strategic issues in the region and how it will affect ASEAN's ability to (i) deal with the emerging big power rivalry in the region (ii) maintain ASEAN centrality and (iii) fulfil its own goals to achieve an ASEAN Community in 2015.
MS IRENE NG PHEK HOONG: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs if he will provide an update on the progress of negotiations between ASEAN and China for a code of conduct governing state behaviour in the South China Sea.
MR ALEX YAM: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to the non-issuance of a joint communiqué during the recent ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, what is its impact on (i) Singapore and (ii) the creation of an ASEAN community by 2015.
REPLY:
Mr Speaker, as the four questions are related, I will take them together. Sir, to begin, I would like to restate Singapore’s position on the South China Sea disputes. We are not a claimant state and we have always maintained that by their very nature, the specific territorial disputes in the South China Sea can only be settled by the parties directly concerned. However, that does not mean that Singapore has no interests in these disputes. Singapore's interests in the disputes, and the South China Sea, including on the question of the freedom of navigation, have been stated clearly on several occasions and I do not propose to repeat them here.
2 It is useful to revisit the roots of ASEAN and how it is important to Singapore, as this will allow us to see the present developments in context. Many in this House know that Singapore was one of the founding members of ASEAN when it was established in 1967, along with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Our governments forged a common cause to maintain order in our region amidst the Cold War. Order was the essential precondition for development and prosperity for our peoples. We agreed to build a region united by a desire for stability and autonomy, promoting regional cooperation rather than competition, to fend off the alternative of a splintered Southeast Asia which would have become an arena for Cold War protagonists and their proxies.
3 Forty-five years on, this imperative still holds true. Building a strong, cohesive and autonomous ASEAN remains a key goal of our foreign policy. ASEAN helps its members manage the inherent complexities of the region as well as the evolving geopolitical order in the Asia-Pacific. Only a united ASEAN can credibly play a central role in engaging major powers towards the common goal of promoting regional peace, stability and prosperity. This strategic underpinning of ASEAN was given fresh impetus with the signing of our Charter in Singapore on 20 November 2007, which ushered ASEAN into a new phase of rules-based and principled regional norms. We agreed to build an ASEAN Community with a capital ‘C’ in 2015. We recognised that an ASEAN Community is critical for maintaining ASEAN’s competitiveness in the region and globally.
4 It was thus regrettable that no Joint Communiqué was issued at the 45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Phnom Penh in July 2012. I say this because the lack of a Joint Communiqué reflects disunity within ASEAN. ASEAN unity and centrality are key to the vision of the ASEAN Community. An ASEAN that is not united and cannot agree on a Joint Communiqué will have difficulties in playing a central role in the region. If we cannot address major issues affecting or happening in our region, ASEAN centrality will be seen as a slogan without a substance. Our ability to shape regional developments will diminish.
5 The reason why there was no Joint Communiqué was that there was no consensus on how to reflect recent developments in South China Sea in the Communiqué. We worked hard to find a compromise. But a compromise could not be reached because of the distance between positions taken by ASEAN members. While several draft formulations were put forward in an effort to bridge the gap, they were unfortunately rejected by one side or the other and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting ended without a Joint Communiqué. All of us were heartened and appreciative that Indonesia managed to broker a common ASEAN position a week after the meetings ended. The ASEAN statement on “Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea” released on the 20 July 2012 has gone some way to repair the damage to ASEAN’s credibility, but more work needs to be done.
6 Some Members have asked about the impact of this incident on ASEAN’s community building efforts. While the Phnom Penh meetings were a setback, I do not think that this in itself will divert us from our goals. We must press on with this important task despite the setback. As between ASEAN members, there is much that needs to be done and should be done to achieve the goal of an ASEAN Community. We must work on that within ASEAN. The setback in Phnom Penh will of course have some impact on ASEAN’s relationships with external partners, in our push for ASEAN Community. The state of the global economy will also have an impact.
7 I said earlier that the failure to issue a Communiqué was linked to recent developments in the South China Sea. As the House knows, territorial claims in the South China Sea involve four ASEAN states and China. However, the claims are not the totality of ASEAN-China interactions, simply one part of many. All ASEAN members regard China as an important and valued partner. The strength of relations is demonstrated by our bilateral trade, which has grown from less than US$10 billion in 1991 to more than US$230 billion in 2010, making China ASEAN's largest trading partner and ASEAN China's third largest trading partner. The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement also entered into force on 1 January 2010. Beyond economics, ASEAN-China cooperation spans across eleven sectors, including environment, culture, and health. China has consistently been one of the strongest supporters of ASEAN’s Community Building efforts, and has devoted effort and resources to help the region. It is clearly in ASEAN’s and China’s interests to maintain and strengthen cooperation for mutual benefit.
8 I have set out these areas of cooperation to provide some context to the heated debate on the outcome of the 45th AMM, the role that China may or may not have played, and the impact on ASEAN-China relations. I think it is simplistic to try and identify any one actor or cause for what happened in Phnom Penh. There were many actors and many causes for the way the events unfolded.
9 ASEAN and all major powers share a common interest in maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea. ASEAN needs to work closely with China, a claimant state, to promote cooperation and manage tensions in the area. A good start is the full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) that both sides signed in 2002 to build confidence and trust amongst the participants. In the same way, ASEAN and China should start talks on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) soon. Recent tensions in the South China Sea underscore the need for the COC discussions to take place sooner rather than later. That would be in everyone’s interest. I wish to underscore that ASEAN as a grouping cannot and does not take sides on the merits of a particular claim or claims. Nor do we attempt to resolve the disputes. That is a matter for the parties directly concerned. ASEAN’s consistent collective position on the issue is that all parties should refrain from the use of force and work together to resolve disputes in accordance with international law, in particular the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Thank you sir.
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TRANSCRIPT OF MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS K SHANMUGAM’S REPLIES TO SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS, 13 AUGUST 2012
SPEAKER: Ms Irene Ng.
MS IRENE NG PHEK HOONG: I would like to thank the Minister for the comprehensive reply. I just would like to ask the Minister, it seems to me that Cambodia’s action as Chair to block mention of the South China Sea disputes was to pander to China, which prefers to deal with the disputes bilaterally with each claimant state rather than multilaterally. But the Cambodian Ambassador to Singapore recently made a different interpretation in his letter published in the Straits Times on August 9. He said that Cambodia was only acting from the position of principle as ASEAN Chair, as it did not want to see ASEAN taking sides in the bilateral dispute, which it said would jeopardise ASEAN. So given the different interpretations, can I ask the Minister two questions on Singapore’s position: First, whether ASEAN should have a united stand on the South China Sea issue and play an effective role in addressing major issues of concern to Southeast Asia. Second, whether Singapore as one of ASEAN’s original members should step up and guide ASEAN, especially its newer members, and with Cambodia in the Chair, at this critical juncture, and to ensure that newer ASEAN members understand the importance of putting the collective interests of ASEAN above national interests when the situation demands it.
MINISTER: Can I clarify Member’s first question, was it that the ASEAN Chair should play a major role in resolving disputes? Sorry, can I ask if that is it?
MS IRENE NG PHEK HOONG: My first question is: what is Singapore’s position on whether ASEAN should have a united stand on the South China Sea issue and also on ASEAN playing an effective role.
MINISTER: On the first question, the position is obviously yes. Most of my answer was directed at the importance of ASEAN taking a united stand and that is necessary for ASEAN to play a central role. And in turn, ASEAN needs to play a central role if this region is to be peaceful and for us to achieve the vision of ASEAN 2015. With regard to the second point, on whether Singapore as one of the founder members will seek to advise Cambodia, I think it is incumbent on all of us to help to achieve consensus within ASEAN. For example, after the 45th AMM, which ended without a Joint Communiqué, Indonesia took it upon itself to try and come up with the Six-Point Principles which everyone agreed to. So I think it is incumbent on everyone to help the Chair, as well as try and bridge whatever gaps there may be to try and get consensus. Thank you.
SPEAKER: Mr Yee Jenn Jong.
MR YEE JENN JONG: I thank the Minister for the comprehensive answer. There have been some scholars that have suggested that open conflict in the South China Sea will become imminent with China and some ASEAN claimants asserting their claims with increasingly high stake gambles. What role can Singapore play to mediate and prevent such open conflicts, and how prepared is Singapore if, unfortunately, such maritime conflicts do take place?
MINISTER: Sir, I think China, the claimant states, including the ASEAN countries, recognise that increasing the amount of tension is not in anyone’s interest. It is not in China’s interest, it is not in the interest of the claimant states, and it is not in the interests of the other countries which are not claimants. Because all of us depend on a certain amount of peace and regional harmony to prevail. Among the various parts of the world in terms of the world economy, the Asia Pacific is a relatively brighter spot today. And it is so because of the free trade flow and the fact that there is not much tension. It is in everyone’s interest to maintain that framework. China has publicly said that, and so have ASEAN countries, both claimants and non-claimants, and other powers interested in the region have also said that. So I don’t think we should probably jump to the conclusion that open conflict would be imminent. If unfortunately that scenario does unfold, we would have to see how it unfolds. But we in Singapore, like others, will undoubtedly try and reduce the tensions. That’s the best answer I can give now.
SPEAKER: Mr Nicholas Fang, last question.
MR NICHOLAS FANG: Thanks Minister again for restating Singapore’s position on this issue. I think this issue has illustrated very clearly that the strategic diversity in ASEAN might overwhelm the economic drive towards unity by 2015. My supplementary question is whether or not issues like the South China Sea and potentially future strategic issues might actually derail the drive towards creating an economic union, given that ASEAN is very different from a mostly land linked region like the Euro, where we actually don’t share a lot of strategic interest as the South China Sea has shown.
MINISTER: I don’t think strategic diversity by itself may overwhelm the ASEAN Community or move towards greater integration, because there is a substantial economic and strategic logic, towards greater integration within ASEAN. At the same time, the economic potential of ASEAN, the fact that it has 600 million people, an economy of 1.8 trillion, the resources in the region and resources in the South China Sea, obviously mean that ASEAN is an area of interest to powers outside of the immediate region, legitimately so. And it is in this situation that ASEAN needs to try and keep itself whole, maintain neutrality, centrality, so that it is a master of its own destiny. Whether it will remain so depends of course on its members and – the forces that may bring us apart may well overwhelm us. You cannot discount that possibility. And if it happens, we will have to deal with it.
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