08 Feb 2022
1 I would like to start by congratulating the co-chairs, Ambassador Alya and Ambassador Martin, on your appointment to steer this important process this year. Your task is a challenging one, but my delegation has full confidence that they will steer our work wisely and in an even-handed, inclusive and transparent manner. I would also like to thank the President of the General Assembly for his statement earlier this morning.
2 We begin yet another year of discussions in the IGN on the complex issue of Security Council reform. We all know what we generally agree on – that the Security Council is in need of reform. We also know where our views diverge – on the terms for reform and the nature of the reform. We also know that none of us realistically expects that reform will happen quickly. But after almost three decades of no concrete outcomes from these discussions, I think it is fair to say that the degree of fatigue and frustration among delegations is at a point where it could make or break the IGN process.
3 Let me make clear. My delegation does not speak for any other country nor do we align with any particular group’s position on the issue of Security Council reform. We speak for ourselves only. Like other delegations, my delegation strongly believes in the importance of Security Council reform and we have expectations that the IGN process will produce some results. Last June, we witnessed some unexpected challenges to the adoption of the draft rollover decision on the IGN. To some extent, we can understand why what happened, happened. But more importantly, we are concerned about the broader question it raises and the implications. Can the IGN still be relevant if it continues to be unable to show any demonstrable progress? That is the question we must ask ourselves. Should we continue employing the current working methods in the IGN if they are unable to produce any results? That too is a question we must all ask here.
4 For Singapore, progress on the issue of Security Council reform is necessary to make the Council more effective and efficient, and in order for it to be able to respond swiftly and decisively to global crises. This is critical if the Security Council is to remain credible and for its decisions to continue enjoying legitimacy. Unfortunately, geopolitical developments and worsening political polarisation have contributed to the erosion of the trust that people have in the Security Council and by extension, in the United Nations. This only weakens the UN and the multilateral system.
5 The reality is that the IGN is currently the only process that is mandated to discuss reform of the Security Council. My delegation believes the IGN remains relevant and that it can still produce results if it engages seriously in negotiations. We are realistic and pragmatic about what progress and outcomes will look like. I think we all need to be realistic and pragmatic too. But there must be political will to take small and incremental steps forward if we are to preserve and continue the IGN process. It is in Member States’ interest to do this because the informal and inter-governmental nature of the IGN provides a safe space for us to discuss the issue of Security Council reform. My delegation is flexible about adjusting how we work in the IGN if this will offer a viable path to making concrete progress. My delegation will also be open to additional meetings or meetings of an “informal-informal” nature if these can help to build common understanding. We will also be open to more focused discussions on the 2021 Co-Chairs’ Elements paper in order to identify more convergent points. In this respect, we will be guided by the views and assessment of the co-chairs.
6 To make progress this year, it is important for us to acknowledge and build on the discussions of previous sessions and start with some common points of understanding. We all know that we are not starting from scratch. We therefore welcome the Co-Chairs’ intention to use as a starting point the Co-Chairs Elements Paper of 2021, which captures the essence of discussions so far and offers a very good foundation for our work going forward. Importantly for Singapore, the 2021 Co-Chairs Elements Paper also provides continuity in the process by preserving the link with the 2015 Framework Document, which we consider a significant reference document on Security Council reform that must be preserved.
7 The Co-Chairs have asked delegations to clarify their positions on the cluster of “Regional Representation” and to reflect on the inter-linkages with the other clusters. With all due respect to the Co-Chairs, this is a question that is posed every year and Singapore’s substantive positions on these issues, as well as on the central aspects of Security Council reform have not changed. Until discussions in the IGN advance and evolve, it is unlikely that my delegation’s position on this and other issues will advance and evolve either. However, I will briefly repeat my delegation’s principled positions and views on these issues for the record.
8 First, for the credibility and legitimacy of the Security Council to be enhanced, we believe it must be more representative and inclusive. This means its composition must better reflect the diversity of the UN membership that exists today, as well as contemporary geopolitical realities. There must be greater geographical representation, especially from under-represented and unrepresented regions.
9 For Singapore, this means there must be an expansion of the membership in both the permanent and non-permanent categories, and an equitable representation of Africa as well as of small states and Small Island Developing States. In that regard, we welcome inclusion of references in the 2021 Co-Chairs Elements Paper to the Common African Position and to small states and SIDS. We look forward to further discussion and elaboration of these issues, including finding a way forward that addresses the African Group’s concern about how to reflect the support expressed for the Common African Position.
10 Second, any reform and expansion of the Council must increase opportunities for all Member States, not just for the aspirants to permanent membership. Ultimately, the reform process must also take into account the interests of small states and of Small Island Developing States, and enhance opportunities for their representation in the Council as well. Any reform should not disadvantage or further marginalise small states and SIDS. This is an important issue for many small states and in particular SIDS, as they do not and will not have the opportunities as others do to serve in the Council.
11 In this regard, Singapore supports the creation of additional non-permanent seats specifically designated for small states and SIDS. We note that some proposals have been made for one rotating seat for SIDS and small states, and we welcome that as a starting point for our discussions here. We would not support any proposals that might negatively impact or further disadvantage small states and SIDS. Singapore is open to considering all proposals on the size and configuration of an expanded Council, provided they do not undermine the Council’s effectiveness and ability to act. As we have not decided our position on the specific details of the regional distribution of potential additional seats, or on the formula for cross-regional representation in an enlarged Council for small States, SIDS and Arab States, I will not comment further on that today. On the broader point of inter-linkages among all the clusters, my delegation is of the view that it would be more productive to have that discussion when we are discussing specific language proposals.
12 Third and finally, Singapore would support focused discussions on the Co-Chairs Elements paper. In this regard, we would like to see a more succinct and streamlined Elements Paper at the end of our work in this session of the UN. Over the last few years, we have built a good base of understanding and elements of commonality and convergence. My delegation is committed to using our time this year in the IGN to make concrete progress to narrow our areas of divergence, so that we can broaden our convergences on the key sticking points. It is our hope that collectively, we can take another step forward this year.
13 In conclusion, let me say that my delegation believes that the window of opportunity to make progress in the IGN is narrowing. If we do not seize this opportunity, the window will close all too quickly. Ultimately, the reform of the Security Council is about strengthening the multilateral system so that all Member States benefit collectively. Thank you.
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