16 Nov 2023
Thank you Mr President.
1 I would like to begin by thanking the Permanent Representative of Kuwait, H.E. Tareq Al-Banai and the Permanent Representative of Austria, H.E. Alexander Marschik, the two co-chairs of the IGN process, for their hard work at the last Session. I congratulate them on their reappointment, and I am glad that this process will remain in their good and experienced hands. I wish them every success, and I assure them of my delegation’s full support.
Mr President,
2 I also share your views, which you expressed in your opening remarks this morning, that the issue of reform of the Security Council has become more pressing than ever, and that there is therefore a real need for meaningful reform.
Mr President,
3 As I begin my remarks, let me underline a point that is well known: Singapore is not part of any informal grouping in the IGN process. We therefore speak only as Singapore and we do not associate ourselves with the position of any group within the IGN process. It has always been Singapore’s approach to look at every proposal in the IGN process from an objective point of view and offer our comments from the perspective of making the UN and the multilateral system stronger and more effective. As a small state, Singapore would like to bring to this debate the perspective of a small country, of which there are many in this chamber. It is important to keep in mind that the reform of the Security Council is not an exercise to address the ambition and interests of the major powers or the regional powers. If the IGN process is to lead to effective outcomes, it must address the needs and interests of all countries, and it must, in particular, address the concerns and priorities of small states who form the silent majority in the General Assembly.
Mr President,
4 The Secretary-General said recently that the world has entered an era marked by the highest level of geopolitical tensions and major power competition in decades. We cannot agree more with this very sobering assessment. The world is indeed polarised and fragmented on many issues and the major powers have unfortunately not always shown signs of working together to manage issues of international peace and security.
5 Yesterday, members of the Security Council, in a rare show of unity, adopted a very important and much-needed resolution on the humanitarian situation in Gaza. We are all, naturally, gratified by this positive development. Yet, the fact remains that the Security Council took forty days to adopt a resolution while the General Assembly, meeting in the format of an Emergency Special Session, was able to act much earlier.
6 What was also evident was that in the Council, there were vetoes, counter-vetoes and “pocket vetoes” before the Council could eventually arrive at adopting Resolution 2712 yesterday afternoon. In the context of geopolitical tensions and political fragmentation, some key questions arise: will enlargement lead to a more effective Council or will it lead to greater disunity, paralysis and inaction? To put the question differently: if there is enlargement, how can we be sure that the UNSC will discharge its mandate effectively and with a sense of urgency?
7 These are questions that we believe require serious reflection in the IGN process. My delegation has always said that reform must lead to a stronger, more effective, and more responsive Security Council. In this regard, the reform of the Security Council has to balance two competing requirements: the need for greater representativeness and the need for more effectiveness. The question of greater representation is related fundamentally to the issue of inclusiveness and legitimacy.
8 The fact is that the Council has not been reformed in sixty years. The one and only time the Council was reformed was when four additional non-permanent seats were added to the Council in 1965, following the adoption of a resolution in December 19631. It is worth noting that, in 1963, the UN only had 113 member states, out of which around forty members were or could be considered small states. Today, we have 193 members and small states, from all regions of the world, form more than half the UN membership. It is therefore vitally important for the IGN process to consider the perspective of small states, many of whom have never had the opportunity to serve as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. In fact, more than 50 small states have never served on the Council. And of those who have served, more than half of them have only served just once on the Security Council.
9 The reality facing many small states is a simple one: the chances of getting elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council is getting smaller and smaller, especially for small states that come from regional groups that do not have an established practice of sub-regional rotation. In theory, the process of elections for a non-permanent seat is “democratic” and open to all states. In practice, however, there is no level playing field for small states.
10 The elections for non-permanent seats are very often dominated by larger regional states, many of whom have established a pattern of seeking a seat on the Council at frequent intervals. Even if a small state were to seek election and exercise its “democratic” right, it is extremely challenging for a small state to campaign and run against much larger states with any success. The last seven decades are full of examples of small states who have failed to be elected to the Security Council.
11 To put it starkly, the door to the Security Council is shut for many small states. There is a glass ceiling that discourages and disadvantages small states from presenting their candidature for elections and from getting elected. In such a context, the question is and we hope this can be addressed in the IGN: how can we level the playing field for small states? The solution does not lie in fancy formulas or mathematical diagrams to show how an expanded Council might look like in the future. What is needed are concrete arrangements that will allow small states adequate and equitable access to membership in the Council.
Mr President,
12 Allow me in this regard to make three points on the question of reform. First, we have consistently supported the need for expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership. Our position remains unchanged. In particular, we recognise the need to address the issue of historical lack of representation and under-representation, in particular for Africa.
13 However, while we support an expansion in permanent membership, we do not look at expansion as a pre-ordained right for the major powers. It is a privilege and a heavy responsibility, and it must be earned. In this regard, there are some related questions we need to address collectively.
14 First, how can we be sure that new permanent members will be committed to upholding international law, international humanitarian law and the principles of the UN Charter, the very topic of our discussions here in this chamber and in the Council the last few weeks? To put it differently, how can we be sure that new permanent members will not behave like old permanent members? Second, what broadly are our expectations for new permanent members? Third, what safeguards can we put in place to ensure that new permanent members will meet our expectations?
15 Recent events in the Council have shown that permanent members do not always rise to meet expectations; neither do they always rise to discharge their Charter responsibilities. Therefore we need to make sure that new permanent members do not act without accountability once they become permanent members. We as Singapore have put forward the idea of a Declaration of Responsibilities for all Council members to be adopted as part of any reform package eventually adopted. I hope that we can examine and discuss this proposal further during this session.
16 Secondly, Singapore would be open to all ideas to make the Council more representative, more transparent and more credible. Over the many years of IGN discussions, several different visions of reform have emerged, which have been captured in the Revised Co-Chairs’ Elements Paper. However, one issue that has not been adequately addressed, at least from our point of view, is the question of representation of small states.
17 We welcome the fact that there are already proposals to allocate, for example, one dedicated seat for small states and SIDs. However, when we compare this with the number of small states that have never served on the Council, which is more than fifty states, allocating just one seat is far from sufficient. If we were to allocate one dedicated non-permanent seat to small states, and given the fact that there are more than 50 states who have never served in the Council, then we will need 100 years to enable all the small states to have just one opportunity to serve in the Council. One hundred years of solitude for small states…! Does this arrangement sound anything like near equitable and reasonable from the point of view of small states? We do appreciate the fact that there are proposals for a dedicated seat for small states and SIDS and we recognise the importance of these proposals. They represent a good start but the point I am making is that we need to move much further and deeper if we are to address the systematic under-representation of small states in the Security Council.
18 Yesterday’s result in the Council (the adoption of Resolution 2712), in which the delegation of Malta played a crucial role in building consensus and finding solutions forward for the Council, demonstrated the value-add that small states can bring to the Council. It underlines the role that small states can potentially play in the Council, provided they have an opportunity to serve in the Council. Therefore any reform process that allocates just a single seat for small states will not level the playing field. And any reform that does not level the playing field will not be credible in the eyes of many small states.
19 My third and last point relates to the question of the veto. This is currently the preserve of the P5, and the P5 hold an important key to reform in how they choose to exercise this tremendous power. We have always been a strong supporter of any initiative to introduce greater accountability in the use of the veto and we will continue to maintain this position. We have also stated that member states, including all members of the P5, should respect the plain meaning of Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter and refrain from voting on a dispute to which one is a party. There is no doubt that the veto is an impediment to a more effective and accountable Council and to fulfilling the Council’s mandate; and the frequent use of the veto to block Council action in recent years has demonstrated this to be very true. It is for this very reason, therefore, that my delegation does not support granting the veto to new permanent members.
20 A related point I wish to make is regarding the working methods of the Security Council. This is an issue which I had addressed in the debate in Council in September on working methods so I do not wish to repeat the points that I have made there. But I want to say that it is important that the Council’s work be made more accessible and transparent to the wider UN membership through open debates, documentation, timely monthly assessment reports from the rotating Presidents of the Council. Another point we had previously made, is that there is a need for an informal exchange between the Council and the wider membership before the annual report of the Council is finalised. This proposal is in accordance with para 129 of Note 507 with which Council members would be very familiar.
Mr President,
21 A difficult year for the UN and for the UNSC is coming to a close but we have also made some good steps forward, including the one taken yesterday. But our work in the IGN has only just begun. We believe that the IGN remains the best vehicle to build consensus on the question of reform; and we believe that reform is possible if there is political will to make progress. We have a collective responsibility to work together to build the broadest possible convergence on the reform of the Security Council. The ultimate goal of our exercise is to make the UN and the multilateral system stronger and more effective.
22 I thank you very much for your attention.
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1 A/RES/1991 (XVIII) “Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council”